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In 1989, the Korea government enacted the new land acts to remedy-land 
speculation. And following that successively in 1990, the government ordered that 
large capitalists (chae/xJ1) sell their large landholding to others who are end users. 
Examining changes in the Korean land policy promulgated in those years, this paper 
argues that land-owning chaebo1 prevented any substantial social transformation. 
Referring to these experiences, the author concludes that land-owning chae/xJ1 are likely 
to hinder the implementation of progressive land reforms under the Kim government. 
Theoretically, the author maintains that capitdist landownership or landownership 
by chae/xJ1 is the main cause of land speculation in Korea. Thus he emphasizes the class 
character of land speculation in Korea. In this respect, he differs from those who argue 
that conflicts between producers and land speculators represent the basic contradiction 
in Korean society. 
INTRODUCTION 
In an effort to launch a policy of clean government, the newly elected 
administration (1993- ) required the disclosure of personal assets of elected 
and executive officials. During February and March 1993, the Korea media 
and public opinion were astonished and angered by the excessive land 
holdings of these officials. Indeed, in a number of cases it was determined 
that the properties had been amassed illegally and both forced and 
voluntary resignations followed. 
Though the general public is very indignant over the disclosed assets of 
power elites, money making through land speculation has been a wide-
spread, if notorious, way of getting rich in Korea. While land speculation 
produced many overnight millionaires, it decreased the upward mobility 
opportunities of those unable to participate in the economy of speculation. 
In this way, the rapid increase in earnings from land speculation over the 
1980s has led to increased class differentiation and social inequality. In 
addition, skyrocketing land prices resulling from this speculation have 
"This is a revision of the paper presented at the First International Conference of Korea 
Studies in the U.S. entitled "Transformation in the Korean Peninsula Toward the 21st 
Century" from July 7 to 11, 1993. 
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aggaravated the urban housing problem such that many people do not have 
access to affordable housing. This increased class differentiation and 
housing inaccessibility have been the focus of social unrest, including labor, 
urban poor, and middle class movements. 
The 1989 and 1990 legal and policy reforms were a response to the 
contentious debate prompted by these problems and civilian unrest. 
However, because these reforms favored the interests of land-owning large 
capitalists (chaebOl), the basic landownership structure has remained 
unchanged. 
CAPITALIST LANDOWNERSHIP AND LAND SPECULATION: 
THEORETICAL ISSUES 
Scholars turned their attention to land speculation in Korea beginning in 
the mid-1980s. T-G. Lee (1984) analyzed the causes of land speculation in 
Korea by comparing the profitability among various investment options. He 
concludes that from the 1960s to the 1980s land investment provided the 
highest profits. This thesis has been confirmed by other scholars and by the 
continued escalation of land speculation. 
Although Lee's analysis of the profitability of land speculation is well-
founded, he did not discuss the social by-products of this trend. In the late 
1980s, Kim and Lee (1989) argued that conflicts between 
producers-capitalists and laborers-and land speculators represent the 
basic contradiction in Korean society. Their argument is based on the thesis 
of George (1879). Though violent and fervent labor disputes were prevailing 
at that time, their argument was widely accepted and presented in their 
bestselling book, Land: the Object of Speculation or the Heart of Life. The land 
policy reform proposals arising from this analysis argue that it is necessary 
to make the market mechanism work through tax reform. The tax reform 
option considers market failure as the main cause of land speculation, 
arguing that tax reform will remedy this failure. 
Instead, I maintain that capitalist landownership is the main cause of land 
speculation. Indeed we will see that land-owning capitalists have been able 
to evade tax reform. Capitalists have successfully lobbied lawmakers, 
managing to evade tax increases, while continuing to make money through 
land development. They get information about land development in 
advance which ensures them windfall gains. Additionally the government 
has helped capitalists make money by land development and infrastructure 
investment (D-H. Han 1992a, Ch.4). It is not an overstatement to suggest 
that the public outcry against land speculation since the late 1980s 
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represents a response to the profits initiated through such political contacts 
and insider information. 
Capitalist landownership has been bolstered by government land policies. 
Large land development projects, urban redevelopment, industriallocation 
and tax policies for the capitalist class have provided capitalists with 
various landownership incen.tives. Large land development projects, for 
example, are open only to large capitalists. Also capitalists have been 
favored through changes in land use classification. The Land Konggaenyom1) 
Study Committee (1989, p.3) demonstrates the enormous profit of capitalists 
through shifts in land use classification. In the case of Incron near Seoul, for 
example, land use classification changed so that Green Zone 
land-farmland, forest, and parks-became Residential Area or Commercial 
Area land. As a reult, the land price increased threefold even before any 
investment or development. In the case of change from forest land to 
residential site, the increase is six-fold. [n Seoul, the increases are even 
higher. If forest land in Seoul's green belt area is changed into a residential 
site in a Commercial Area, the land price increases about 40 times (Y-P. Kim 
1985, p. 669). 
Thus, construction corporations get more gains from land value 
increments than from construction profits. They get information in advance 
about land development and buy land a·t low prices before development 
begins. In Seoul, for example, construction companies have bought land 
even in areas where construction opporhmities are limited. It amounts to 
about 110 acres (The Naeway Economic Daily, June 14, 1989). After purchasing 
this land, they participate in land development and profit both from land 
value increments and construction earnings. 
Consequently, many large capitalist conglomerates established 
construction companies in order to participate in large land development 
projects. Participating in large land development enabled most construction 
corporations to grow rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s. Even though it could 
not be denied that chaelv1 construction cO~TIpanies to a great extent earned 
profits from the construction boom in middle east Asia, they got windfall 
gains from land value increment as above mentioned. As it were, for these 
construction corporations, land became a financial asset. 2) This is 
particularly true for financial corporations. 
Financial corporations bought and sold land in central urban areas. Stock 
companies participated in land speculation by establishing branch 
lKonggaenyom means public control over landownership and land use. This concept will be 
explained more in this paper. 
2Harvey (1982) for discussions about land as a financial asset. 
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corporations thus evading stringent laws curtailing the land purchase of 
corporations. While banks and stock companies invested in land dealing by 
establishing branches, insurance companies also participated in land 
dealing as an integral part of their business. That is, laws relevant to land 
dealing grant advantageous rights to insurance companies. The value of 
downtown land which financial capitals bought rapidly increased in 
conjunction with the extension of urban infrastructure, which Harvey (1982) 
calls the built-environment. Thus land-owning capitalists are rewarded by 
the fruits of social development without any toil. 
In addition to construction and financial corporations, property 
companies, manufacturing companies, tourist companies, agribusiness and 
forest companies have also participated in land speculation. The Association 
of Hog Farmers announced that while most hog farms owned by chaelu'1 
have extensive land, less than 10% is used for hog farming. This is true of 
ranches owned by chaelu'1 (D-H. Han 1992a, pp. 54- 55). chaelu'1 started tourist 
companies to participate in developing golf courses. Golf course 
development was stipulated as a tourist business by law until 1990. Though 
capitalists could buy land for golf courses at low prices, the price of golf 
course land increased rapidly. Manufacturing companies were also able to 
purchase more land than necessary for factory building at low prices with 
the help of the government. The value of such land also increased rapidly 
through changes in land use. Also relocation resulted in enormous profits. 
In summary, in Korea, large capitalists actively participate in land 
speculation. So capitalist landownership is the most important factor in land 
speculation. Capitalists have more money than any other classes. And they 
have an advantageous position in getting information about land 
development projects. In fact, they have agencies for land development. 
Finally, they can influence legal policy which favors their interests, and 
discriminates against other classes. 
LAND SPECULATION AND CLASS POLITICS 
As mentioned above, those who benefited most from land speculation are 
land-owning capitalist conglomerates (chaelu1). Of course, speculators such 
as power elites and wealthy women speculators (Pokbuin) have also 
benefited. While they get unearned gains so much through land 
speculation, working people and the landless middle class have been 
deprived. 
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Social Differentiation Resulting From Land Speculation 
Accurate statistics about the amounts of unearned income resulting from 
land speculation have not been published, much less statistics concerning 
resulting class inequality. However, we can estimate social differentiation on 
the basis of land value increment gains. Son (1990), a member of the Land 
Konggaenyom Study Committee, calculated the land value increment gains 
and compared them with other economic indices. 
These statistics were calculated on the basis of land price increases. So the 
gains are not realized. However, this data shows land speculators were able 
to get so much that the amount reached 81.1 % of all working people's 
compensation in 1987 and 135.4% in 1988 (See Table 1). Thus unearned 
capital gains surpass income gains. Son calculated the above mentioned 
statistics on the basis of government agency data. If we can recalculate the 
statistics on the basis of market value, the capital gains are even greater. 
These capital gains are concentrated into the hands of big landowners. In 
June 1988, the top 5% of the population owned 65.2 % of privately owned 
land. As a result, the top 5% enjoy most of the land value increments. In 
1987, the top 5% enjoyed 57% of total capital gains, and in 1988, 59.6% (Son 
1990, p.24). Much more, most big landowners use others' names (sons and 
daughters', relatives', and employees', etc.) to hide their property 
acquisition. Especially, they use this method for registration of farmland (D. 
H. Han 1992a, Ch.5). According to ChaebOls' own reports, the ratio of land 
registered by relatives and employees is about 8.7% of their own total land. 
Some Chaerols are notorious for excessive landownership by using others' 
names. For example, Tong II ChaebOl possesses five times more land 
registered in the name of employees and relatives than registered legally in 
TABLE 1. TOTAL VALUE OF AND CAPITAL GAII\-S FROM PRIVATELY OWNED LAND 
(Unit: billon won) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 
Total Value of 
158,163 
Privately Owned land 169,086 
181,428 216,234 
Capital Gains(CG) 10,923 12,341 34,806 67,902 
CG/GNP 14.0% 13.6% 33.0% 54.9% 
CG / Disposable income 15.4% 14.9% 36.1% 60.4% 
CG/Employee Compensation 34.2% 34.0% 81.1% 135.4% 
CG/Central Gov't 
80.4% 80.6% 199.0% 303.1% Expenditure 
Source: Son (1990, p.24). 
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the name of the corporations. Samsung chaero1 owns an amusement park 
(about 4,000,000 pyong = about 3,300 acre) which is registered under about 
40 names. If the land was registered only under the corporate name, land 
concentration would turn out to be much higher, as would capital gains 
concentration. 
While big land owners gain much from land speculation, the deprived 
suffer from difficulties in living decent lives because of soaring prices. In 
urban areas, the majority of the urban poor and middle class suffered from 
the soaring cost of housing (See Table 2). Even in 1985, the price of houses 
and rentals was considerable. Nevertheless, in the late 1980s, the price and 
rent rose at high speed. Especially the housing rent rose very rapidly, which 
means the situation of homeless people became more difficult. The 
government tried to build high rise apartments in order to ameliorate the 
housing problem. Considering the rapid increase of housing rent, the goals 
of the government were quite conscionable. However, most of the costs for 
building the apartments were shouldered by the private sector, which 
means that the urban poor could not afford to buy the newly built 
apartments. On the contrary, they were deprived of accessibility to public 
land. In 1990, about 60,000 poor people in Seoul were living in vinyl plastic 
hothouses or dugout mud huts-miserable conditions. They were pushed 
out of the dugout mud huts and shanties that they built on public land. 
And, not all the middle class can afford to buy a newly built apartment. The 
supply was short, in the face of mounting excessive demand in the late 
1980s. 
According to social opinion surveys about the land and housing problem, 
more and more people feel the housing problem is getting worse. These 
surveys (The Korea National Housing Bank 1990) show that among 
respondents those who feel it is a very serious problem have risen from 32% 
in 1986 to 42% in 1988, and 52% in 1989. 
Most scholars studying land speculation only consider the urban land 
problem. In fact, peasants are also among the deprived. In rural areas 
TABLE 2. INDICES OF HOUSING PRICE AND HOUSING RENT 
Sale Price Rent 
Year 1985 86 87 88 89 1985 86 87 88 89 
Urban area 100 97.3 104.2 118.0 135.2 100 105.6 126.2 142.9 168.0 
Seoul 100 95.5 97.5 106.4 124.1 100 104.5 123.6 132.7 164.2 
5 Big Cities 100 99.2 112.4 131.2 146.5 100 106.3 128.8 152.1 169.5 
31 Other Cities 100 98.9 109.5 128.1 146.4 100 107.4 128.9 154.8 174.9 
Source: The Korea National Housing Corporation, Handbook of Housing, 1990. 
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influenced by land speculation, 6.e price of farmland and forest land 
increased very rapidly. Capital gains from selling land deprived peasants of 
industry. Many peasants sold thei.r land and some became brokers for 
speculators. Of course, rural poor didn't have enough land to become 
millionaires. Generally, the rules of the speculation game were very severe 
to most peasants (D-H. Han 1992a, Ch.5). What is worse, many peasants 
living near Seoul have been forcefully pushed out from their own land and 
home by large land development projects such as building new towns. 
Social Conflicts Arising From Differenhation 
Difficulties of the poor resulting from land speculation, more directly 
from housing inaccessibility drove some people to commit suicide. From 
February to April 1990, 18 people committed suicide because they could not 
afford the rent hikes (The Han-Kook Daily April 13, 1993). Most of victims 
were heads of family or housewives. In the worst case, the rent hikes drove 
a whole family to commit suicide. And some people committed burglary 
and theft in preparation for increased rents. These behaviors are a kind of 
everyday forms of poor people's resistance}) 
Organizational disputes as well as everyday forms of resistance were 
initiated by land speculation and the housing problem. As the places they 
could afford to live in were more and more transformed into middle class 
housing or upper class housing, their protest was very fierce in the late 
1980s. Urban poor resisted land re-development policies which demolished 
their houses. There were various movements of the urban poor. The early 
1970s Kwangju Complex riot near Seoul is a famous incident of the urban 
poor movement in the early 1970s. After the riot, the urban poor movement 
was not organized until the 1983 N:ok-dong urban poor struggle in Seoul. 
This three year struggle was so fervent that it aroused public resentment 
toward land redevelopment projects. The organized urban poor movement 
has developed owing to the Mok-dong movement. The Sa dang-dong urban 
poor struggle continued from April 1985 to November 1985. The 
redevelopment project was postponed because of this movement for a short 
period. The Sanggye-dong urban poor struggle continued from March 1986 
to December 1986. After that, the Sanggye-dong movement continued in 
Myongdong Catholic Church which was the center of civil political protest 
in Summer 1987. Those living in the shelter tents at Myilngdong Church 
participated in the June Protest-the national civil protest against the 
31 borrowed this term from Scott (1985). He used this term to describe forms of peasant 
resistance. 
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military government-in 1987 (Yeon 1992). In July 1987, the Displaced 
Coalition of Seoul (DCS) was organized in order to struggle more 
systematically against land redevelopment projects in urban areas. They 
demanded that the government discard the clearing policy of slums, abolish 
the redevelopment act, eradicate land speculation, and prepare for housing 
for poor (S-J. Han, 1988). They say that this organization is the first urban 
poor mass organization independent of religious leadership. 
Beginning in July 1987, the clearing policy of slums was executed with the 
help of a privately organized gangster organization. The DCS had its most 
fierce encounter with the gangster organization in the Sadang-dong struggle 
in October, 1987. In February 1988, The Urban Poor Conference of Seoul was 
organized. This organization included the DCS and other religiOUS urban 
poor organizations. It asked the government to prepare for social housing 
for the urban poor. 
In November 1989, the Preparatory Committee for the National Coalition 
of Poor (NCP) was organized. The NCP was organized including the DCS, 
the National Coalition of Street Vendors, and the Daily Construction 
Workers Union of the Southern Area. The NCP was an active political group 
among the National Coalition in 1990. Some urban poor partiCipated in civil 
movements such as the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ). 
Though the CCEJ included various classes and strata, it is called a middle 
class movement. In July 1989, about 500 people founded this organization. 
This organization has many policy goals for achieving economic justice. The 
first and most important one among them is to eradicate easy money 
making by real estate speculation (Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice 
1991). They maintain that the main conflict in Korean society is not the class 
struggle between laborers and capitalists but the contradiction between 
producers and easy money makers. In 1989, several symposia and rallies 
were organized to promote more progressive land related bills than those 
proposed by the government. Rallies were organized in September and 
December 1989. Parliament Watch was organized in November 1989, to 
observe and appraise economic policy and the legislative process. They 
suggested a reform bill to prevent land speculation and to protect lessees. 
The Urban Poor Council of the CCEJ was organized in Jan 1990 and held a 
public forum and various types of actions such as a rally in front of the 
national government office complex in Kwachon, near Seoul. About 3000 
people participated in this rally (The Han-Kook Daily, January 17, 1990). 
While the CCEJ is not a large organization, it has been influential in stirring 
up public resentment. 
Organized labor movements erupted after the June Protest in 1987. Some 
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unions expressed their opinions on housing clearly. As a matter of fact, their 
resentment about the land and housing problem was reflected in their 
demands for raising wages (Kim and Yun 1991; Seon 1992). 
LAND POLICY REFORMS AND CAPITALIST INTERESTS 
We have seen that building high rise apartments cannot solve the social 
conflicts resulting from land speculation. To make matters worse, it costs the 
government more and more to acquire the land for housing and 
infrastructure because of soaring land prices. Thus, the government tried to 
control land speculation. 
At first, the government tried to institutionalize conflicts over land 
speculation, i. e., to strengthen pu bJic control over land through changes in 
taxation policy. In summer 1988, the government launched the Land 
Konggaenyom Study Committee to introduce a new land policy. Mr. Roh, 
then President, avowed that he would eradicate unearned income resulting 
from land speculation. This special committee was formed to advise the 
president. With the help of this committee, the government introduced the 
land Konggaenyom legislation. 
Land Konggaenyom advocates giving priority to the public interests over 
the landed interest.4) Newly introduced land laws are as follows: the 
Comprehensive Land Tax, the Development Gains Charge Law, the Land 
Excess Profits Tax Law, and the Residential Land Ownership Limit Law. 
The comprehensive land tax introduced in June 1989 as a part of the Local 
Tax Law is an integral part of the Land Konggaenyom legislation. This tax 
adds up all of an owner's land and charges a progressive rate. In addition, 
the government amended ongoing tax laws and rules : the acquisition tax, 
the transfer income tax, and the special surtax on corporate income tax. 
The Development Gains Charge Law and the Land Excess Profits Tax 
Law aim to enable the government to appropriate windfall gains resulting 
from land value increment. The Development Gains Charge Law stipulates 
that 50% of land value increment above the construction profits should be 
paid to the government by the developer. The Land Excess Profits Tax Law 
imposes a tax on the land the p:ice of which rapidly increases owing to 
development of neighboring lands. This burden is shouldered by 
landowners, not by developers. 
The Residential Land Ownership Limit Law sets a limit on the amount of 
housing land a household can ow::l. Therefore, this law is a direct regulation 
41 acknowledge the advice of Dr. H. S. KiLl of the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement 
in determining this transliteration. 
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on large land ownership. This law stipulates that a household can own up 
to about 800 square yard of housing land in the six large cities, 1,200 square 
yard in other cities, and 1,600 square yard in rural areas. 
These laws tried to appropriate unearned income resulting from land 
speculation. Generally the aims of this legislation are conscionable, but they 
grant many exemptions for land-owning capitalists. During the debate over 
the legislation, capitalist interests were against the land Konggaenyom 
legislation. The Korea Federation of Industries (1989) said that the land 
Konggaenyom would slow down the efficiency of land use and land for 
productive purpose should not shoulder higher tax. And many law-makers 
themselves were landed interests and land-owning capitalists. Especially 
some subcommittee members of the Construction Committee in Parliament 
were land-owning capitalists. Ironically this subcommittee was the most 
influential in stipulating the contents of the land Konggaenyom legislation. 
One member of the subcommittee, Lee Won Bae, was put into prison in 1991 
because he recievied a big bribery from a land-owning capitalist 
conglomerate, Han 80 chael:v1. This scandal shows that many land-owning 
capitalists lobbied law-makers to pass the land Konggaenyom legislation to 
their own advantage. Thus, at that time of passing the legislation, the CCEJ 
and scholars bitterly criticized the process and results of the land 
Konggaenyom legislation. But all of their criticism were oriented toward 
lower taxes on speculation in general. As they did not consider land owning 
capitalists as the main cause of land speculation, so they did not feel it was 
necessary to introduce special measures against land owning capitalists. 
Differing from them, the goverment directly attacked the land-owning 
large capitalists independently of tax reforms. In May 8, 1990, the 
government announced that big capitalists sell their excessively owned land 
to those who are end users and that 49 large capitalist conglomerates cannot 
acquire properties for the duration. Also properties acquired by using 
unauthorized owners (e. g. relatives of top executives and retired or present 
employees) were required to be registered again with actual owners. These 
measures were a kind of direct control of the government over land-owning 
large capitalists. Two large organizations of capitalists such as the Korea 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Korea Federation of Industries 
clearly expressed their dissatisfaction. While at first, the capitalist interests 
said these measures were not lawful, they were forced to follow 
government policy. Instead, they lobbied the government to their advantage 
in the process of policy implementation. 
The Korea Federation of Industries set up a special committee to follow 
government policy. Jeong Tae-Su, the tycoon of Han-Bo chael:v1, was the 
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chairman of the committee. He was organizing land speculation on a large 
scale at that time. After one year, he was put into prison because of 
notorious land speculation-the Suoo scandal. This tells outright that the 
committee was an interest group of land-owning large capitalists. In fact, 
the 1990 decree was implemenated through bargaining between the 
government and chaew1. While the general resentment over land speculation 
forced the government to attack the land-owning capitalists to some extent, 
at the same time the goverment could not override the wishes of them. The 
definition of the excessively owned land was changed through bargaining. 
The government tried to relieve ct!aero1 of obligations through changing the 
related rules and laws such that the decree was almost nullified. Thus, land-
owning capitalist interests generall.y remained the same. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS: FUTURE PROSPECTS UNDER KIM YONG-
SAM'S GOVERNMENT 
The 1989-1990 reforms do not relieve the new government of the tedious 
land problems. They have been touched off by the recent public disclosure 
measures of government appointees' and law makers' assets. The disclosure 
tells us that most of power elites earned windfall gains through land and 
property speculation. Some appointees and law makers had to resign their 
office after public opinion strongly criticized their money making methods. 
The resignation of some appointees and law makers demonstrates that 
despite tax reforms and policy reforms in 1989 and 1990, land speculation 
has not been eradicated. 
Consequently the new government aims to correct public attitudes on 
land speculation through tax reform. President Kim said at the meeting of a 
committee-the New Economy Committee-that the government would 
reform tax related laws to make owning a large amount of land and other 
immovable assets a financial burden for the owner (The Korea Herald, April 
17, 1993). The new government thinks that such reform is essential to 
preserving democracy. If this policy is implemented correctly, it will to some 
extent ameliorate land problems in Korea. However, as long as the new land 
policy is only based on tax reform, it seems to this author that the land 
problem will not be solved. Because land-owning large capitalist 
conglomerates will likely hinder the implementation of progressive reform 
and the promulgation of meaningful legal change, as in 1989 and 1990. 
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